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MARKETING AND TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY 
IN A "MEDIUM-TECH" STARTUP: 
A MODEL FOR CONCURRENT DEVELOPMENT' 
ABSTRACT 
The computer industry is characterized by a number of 
successful and unsuccessful start-ups. Past studies of 
innovation have presented "market pull" and "technology 
push" models to describe the development of new products. 
This paper proposes a synthesized model of concurrent 
technology and market strategy development. This model is 
illustrated with a case study of a successful "medium- 
technology1' start-up company. For this start-up firm, 
market needs drove the development of technology while the 
technology enabled the firm to achieve its market strategy. 
INTRODUCTION 
What is the interplay among market, technology, 
strategy and business considerations when launching a start- 
up which will rely heavily on technology? Can a firm in 
this situation separate marketing strategy from 
considerations of technology? The purpose of this paper is 
to propose a model of innovation that involves concurrent 
development of marketing and technology strategy. The paper 
argues that firms with technologically-based products or 
services must closely integrate marketing and technology 
strategy. The paper extends two models of innovation to 
propose a new model of concurrent strategy development. 
This model is iliustrated with a case study of a "medium- 
techn~logy~~ startup firm. 
'The author wishes to thank Professor William Guth and Terry Finch for lheir corn~nents on a11 eailicr 
version of this paper. 
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THE MODEL 
There have been a number of studies of the innovation 
process and factors which promote it. For an economic 
analysis based on Schumpeter and Galbraith, see Kamien and 
Schwartz (1982). This reference also provides the 
background for the model described in this section. 
Burgelman and Sayles (1986) discuss the problem of 
transforming invention into innovation. These authors 
present two models of the transformation, one driven by 
marketing needs and the other by technology. In Figures 1-3 
which follow, numbers on the figure refer to the sequence in 
which events are expected to occur. 
Market Driven Innovation 
Market driven innovation is shown in Figure 1. Here 
external market needs (arrow 1 in the figure) force the 
organization to draw on internal and/or external knowledge 
(arrows 2 and 3 on the top and bottom left of Figure 1) to 
develop a solution to a perceived need (4). Once the need 
is identified, the technical staff can work on developing 
solutions which satisfy the needs of the external market 
(5) 
The major problem with this model is the confusion it 
creates for the technical staff which may feel that it has 
to find a solution for a moving target. There may also be 
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pressure from marketing so that a basically sound idea is 
burdened with too many compromises. The greatest risk, of 
course, is not being able to generate the technology needed 
to solve the problem. 
Technology Driven Innovation 
In technology driven innovation, depicted in Figure 2, 
the technology is the primary driving force in developing a 
product or service. Internal and external knowledge lead to 
a technical idea (arrows 1 and 2 on the top and bottom left 
of Figure 2; the technologist must develop a solution ( 3 ) .  
The solution to the technical problem has to be marketed 
(4,5). The technologist must obtain support in the 
organization for the "invention" because he or she probably 
cannot display a strong market need. Funding is always a 
problem in the absence of a demonstrated market demand. 
There are several potential problems with a technology- 
driven innovation. Sometimes the technologist becomes 
locked into a particular type of solution which turns out to 
be inappropriate. If there has been limited market 
research, a product may be designed for the unusual customer 
rather than the typical user. 
Concurrent Technology and Market   riven Innovation 
Both the market-driven innovation model in Figure 1 and 
the technology-driven innovation model in Figure 2 represent 
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sequential as opposed to concurrent development processes. 
The major problems with sequential strategy development 
include its potential for conflict and delay. The first 
group, either marketing or technology, builds a stake in its 
work and there is a high potential for conflict when the 
innovation is passed on to the next group. Innovations are 
delayed because development takes place as a series of 
sequential steps rather than in parallel. 
There appears to be a growing consensus in industry 
that many current sequential activities should be done in 
parallel, As an example concurrent engineering is being 
used in a number of industries to dramatically reduce new 
product development times compared with sequential product 
development (Business Week, 10/28/91). These efforts 
usually involve teams drawn from a number of functional 
areas; the teams include the skills necessary to develop a 
new product. 
Kanter (1985) has argued that innovation necessitates 
boundary spanning in the organization. She suggests that 
successful entrepreneurial activity requires management by 
mutual adjustment rather than by command; mutual adjustment 
in turn requires integrative organizational structures like 
project teams (Kanter 1985). Results from an internal 
venturing data base also suggest that marketing and 
technology should be considered together in new ventures 
(Sykes, 1986). Noori (1990) discusses the integration of 
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market driven (demand pull) and technology driven 
(technology push) and argues that the chances for success 
are greater if technical and market factors are considered 
together. 
Figure 3 presents an extended model of innovation which 
stresses concurrent development of technology and market 
strategy. In Figure 3, the firm has some knowledge of the 
market and its needs (arrow 1). The firm is also 
knowledgable about technology; its internal and technical 
knowledge provide an understanding of how technology can 
enable it to solve the technical requirements needed to meet 
market goals (3). The start-up has to acquire technical 
capabilities by hiring staff members. The knowledge base of 
the firm enables it to solve technical problems, 
occasionally with the help of external parties (4). In this 
model, knowledge about technology allows the firm to set and 
achieve realistic market goals (5). 
Concurrent considerations of marketing and technology 
reflect the close coupling between these two strategies in 
companies that offer a technological product or service. 
Concurrent activities require more coordination and greater 
familiarity with both marketing and technology on the part 
of management. The concurrent approach should result in 
shorter development times and fewer changes in products and 
services. 
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THE CASE OF A MEDIUM TECH START UP 
The model in Figure 3 and the case study which follows 
demonstrate how technology and marketing considerations are 
intertwined in a l'medium-tech" start-up firm known as URI. 
Information about the company came from interviews with key 
staff members, attending several staff meetings, and 
spending a day with a major client of URI. 
URI depends on the technology for its main product, but 
also faces severe competition and a skeptical market. Its 
success is due to an ability to solve technical problems 
while maintaining its market strategy. The model in Figure 
3 describes the development of URI, a new firm that offers a 
data product to its customers. The past experience of the 
company's founders provided a good sense of the market; 
these entrepreneurs understood the technical issues and 
problems in coming up with a product for the market. A high 
priority was to develop the internal knowledge and skill 
necessary to develop a technical solution. In addition, 
external parties were involved for financing and to form 
strategic alliances to 1) provide service and 2) establish 
credibility with potential customers. 
The Produc t  
Figure 4 is a schematic of the product offered by URI. 
The company provides proprietary data to its clients. Each 
user of the system has a workstation on his or her desk. The 
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workstation is a personal computer with a windowed 
interface; the system does not require a powerful personal 
computer needed for a windowing product like Microsof: 
Windows 3.0. The user can display different aspects of the 
data in different windows and can have the workstation 
notify him or her when a particular condition arises. The 
workstations in an office are all connected to a local area 
network. 
The URI system also has a data machine located in a 
major U.S. city; the data machine takes in data from a 
number of providers, formats the data, and transmits it over 
a satellite network to customer locations. Each customer 
has a satellite dish on the roof to receive these data and 
to send messages back to the URI data base machine. 
The user's office has a personal computer that is 
called the data server. Data from the satellite fee? is 
directed to this server; the server in turn updates all of 
the local users of the data. Some users have a second 
server which provides office automation tools like 
electronic mail, word processing, presentation graphics, 
spreadsheet analysis, etc. 
Critical Events in t h e  Growth of U R I  
Table 1 is a list of the critical events in the 
formation of URI; the table also indicates the business, 
market strategy and technological significance of each 
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event. Table 1 is a history of the conpany; the model in 
~igure 3 has been used to interpret the events in Table 1 in 
the analysis that follows. Table 1 can be viewed as a case 
history of the start-up of this medium-technology firm. 
Ear ly  H i s t o r y  
URI came into existence because of a merger. The 
founder of the company worked for a firm that merged with 
another competitor. He did not want to work for the 
competitor and, after much consideration, decided to start 
his own firm instead of seeking another job in the industry. 
The founder and his staff had developed a functionally 
similar system using a different systens architecture at 
their former employer. The founder quickly gathered a core 
group of three other individuals whom he thought might be 
interested in starting URI. The group felt it possessed two 
key factors that would contribute to the success of a start- 
up firm: 
1. It had a good feeling for the general market for the 
type of service it proposed developing, 
2. It had a vision for a modern computer architecture 
that would make it the low-cost provider of a service 
with extremely high functionalit:-. 
Before the founding of URI was ccxpleted, there were 
several important meetings. The firs: of these was at the 
founder's apartment in which the general thrust of the 
business was established. A subsequent meeting at a local 
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university created plans for the founder's "dream system1' 
for the workstation. 
Starting a Business 
From the initial excitement over a product and 
marketing strategy, the next steps in the creation of URI 
were driven by business needs. A start-up requires funding 
to hire staff and develop its product. The founder had a 
business plan that indicated a break-even for the firm in 
about three years; funding was crucial to develop the 
product and support a marketing effort. 
The contacts the founder had built in the industry, 
combined with the efforts of his former superior who had 
retired shortly before the merger mentioned earlier, helped 
the company locate a single source of funds for its venture. 
The firm offering funds would treat URI as a subsidiary and 
agreed to buy the firm at a specified time in the future. 
Why was th'e funding firm eager to launch a start up? 
This multinational company had a number of complementary 
data products; it saw the URI system as a potential delivery 
platform for existing and planned services. The funding 
firm had contemplated developing a similar system; it could 
now invest in a firm with a highly-qualified staff 2nd 
extensive experience in the area. 
Early funding was crucial 2 s  URI needed to move quickly 
to build a design team; many of chese individuals came frbom 
the founder's former employer. It was important to attract 
them before they left the merged firms. A minor, but time- 
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consuming detail, was to find suitable offices for the new 
venture. 
Thinking About the System 
With the problems above solved, the focus at U R I  turned 
to the system. There were a number of goals that grew from 
marketing objectives: 
1) To provide low-cost leadership with high 
functionality, 
2) To appeal to the general customer, 
3) To provide an open architecture so the client could 
add to the system on the desktop. 
These marketing objectives led to features that were 
important in the technical design of the system including: 
1. The ability to run on a modest personal computer of 
the AT class. This requirement was important to being 
a low-cost producer; competitors were designing systems 
that required 386 class machines with large, expensive 
memories, 
2. Providing DOS system windowing. 
3. Pushing as much processing to the desktop as 
possible where it could be done with fast response 
times compared to existing mainframe systems (most 
competitors at the time used "dumb" terminals on the 
desktop only), 
4. Providing an open architecture with great 
flexibility; the client could easily integrate any 
number of PC products with the system; he or she would 
not be constrained to a particular spreadsheet or word 
processor, 
5. Offering its own data machine rather than buying a 
data service and distributing it. URI wanted conplete 
responsibility for the system so that it could provide 
high service levels, 
6. Using a two-way satellite transmission network for 
easy extension of the system; given the high initial 
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cost of leasing satellite transponders, new customers 
could be added by placing a satellite dish on the roof. 
URI had several critical problems to solve to achieve 
these technical objectives as shown in Table 1. First, che 
designers needed a server that would do multi-tasking. A 
decision was made to use the Unix operating system on the 
server. However, it was clear that the server for office 
automation would have to run a Novell network in order to 
provide PC-based products for the workstations. (Software 
for word processing, spreadsheets and other office 
automation functions would be resident on the office 
automation server, not at each workstation. Workstations 
would download the software from the server.) 
At a conference a URI employee found a solution to let 
the UNIX system communicate with Novell. The choice of UNIX 
and the solution to the two server communication problem is 
estimated to have saved six months in development. 
Another naj'or event during development was a decision 
to use the funding firm's new communications network which 
featured satellite communications. URI could take advarirage 
of this satellite network which features two-way 
communications, but would have to conform to the 
requirements of the network. U R I  decided to use this 
network for both technical reasons and political ones (to be 
responsive to its investor). 
At this point URI formed a strategic alliance; it 
arranged with a national vendor to service its hardware and 
software in 'the field. Now a small firm could advertise 
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nation-wide service for its products. (Such alliances are 
increasingly common in the computer field; a number of PC 
mail-order houses use the services of national firns to 
maintain their products.) 
A Working System 
URI1s development effort was organized into three 
parts: the workstation, the network and the data machine. 
Each group, of course, had to meet interface requirements. 
The data machine had to provide the network with a stream of 
data. The data server had to accept these data and broadcast 
them to the workstations. Each workstation had to know how 
to interpret and display the data according to user 
requests. 
To reduce development time, URI bought software when it 
appeared that it would be faster than developing it. In 
particular, the firm bought and modified programs to make 
DOS support multiple windows on the screen at the same time. 
It also purchased software to process data and distribute it 
through the data machine, though eventually URI rewrote most 
of this code. 
A breakthrough occurred when the first data window was 
created on a workstation. Now URS knew it was possible to 
build the system,it envisioned. URI could offer product 
demonstrations. As one employee put it, "we were never ready 
until the last minute to show a promised feature, but we 
managed to pull off the demo each time." 
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The First Customers 
The first customer was a small, local firm that wanted 
six PCs. This firm gave URI a chance to set up a complece 
system at a customer site and to have a place for further 
demonstrations. This contract was followed by one from a 
prestigious customer that helped U R I  establish credibility. 
The biggest challenge was a contract with a very large firm 
for 1500 PCs. U R I  extended itself to install and support 
all of these systems. 
During 1990 U R I  experienced a huge increase in the 
number of accounts, but was leasing fewer workstations to 
each than originally forecast. During this time, it began 
to develop customers in a special niche that had not been 
anticipated by the founder. These niche users tended to 
subscribe to more services and to be more profitable than 
the general customer who was the original focus of the 
product. In late 1990 and early 1991 U R I  was faced witn the 
dual problems of sustaining rapid growth and simultaneously 
trying to maincain its entrepreneurial atmosphere. 
HAS URI BEEN SUCCESSFUL? 
Figure 5 presents a graph of several key statistics 
describing the growth of U R I  during its first 36 months of 
business. The number of employees has increased steadily to 
just over 100 today. Within two years of its founding, U R I  
began a substantial growth curve in number of installed 
workstations. Simultaneously, the firm began to recognize 
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substantial revenue from its services. Breakeven and a 
profit should occur during the fourth year of operations. 
Interviews with users of the system showed that the 
product is viewed as superior to competitorsf offerings. 
For the same costs, the customer receives increased 
functionality and greater ease-of-use when URIrs product is 
compared with the competition. One customer even featured 
the URI system in its annual report to show its modern 
approach to doing business. Given the generally high 
failure rate of new businesses, it seems safe to conclude 
that URI has had a successful first three years in business. 
Key Marketing Decisions 
There were a number of key marketing decisions that 
have been central to URI1s strategy: 
I. Focusing on the business the URI staff knew best, 
2. Competing.on cost/performance; being the low cost 
producer for a given level of performance; this 
strategy suggested an entry-level PC-AT workstation 
with DOS, 
3. Providing better service than the competition, 
4. Modifing the system to provide for special requssts, 
e . g .  helping one client update all of its processing 
and move it to a LAN, 
5. Moving toward a new market niche where the system is 
concentrated physically and users tend to take more 
services leading to higher margins. 
Some of these strategies have been suggested by others, for 
example, developing a superior product and entering a market 
where large established firms fail to compete (Dorfman, 
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1987). However, URI pursued this combination of multiple 
strategies with a concentrated effort. 
Key Technical Decisions 
The key marketing decisions above interacted with the 
technical decisions described below. It appears that the 
marketing decisions had priority, but much of the marketing 
strategy was only possible because of the available 
technology and URI1s expertise in exploiting it. Key 
technology decisions include: 
1. The Workstation 
Putting information processing as close to the 
user's desk as possible 
Using the PC for its processing power, not as a 
terminal 
Using DOS for cost/performance reasons-both hardware 
and software 
Developing an open architecture so that user can add 
other packages; the system is expandable 
Includinq .a terminal emulation window for access to 
a customgr s mainframe systems 
2. The LAN (local area network) 
Choosing Novell for the network 
Finding the minicomputer for the data server 
Choosing Unix for the data server 
Finding a solution for letting the server and Unix 
communicate with Novell 
3. The WAN (wide area network) 
Using of two-way satellite to keep up with the 
competition and for ease of expansion 
Using terrestrial lines for customer mainframe 
access and to backup the network 
Using the funding firm's network 
4. The Data Plant 
Assuming end-to-end responsibility for its system 
Choosing to purchase data plant software 
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CONCURRENT DEVELOPMENT AT URT 
Success Factors 
For URI, the external market dictated the appropriate 
level of technology and key technological decisions had to 
be based on cost/performance. Marketing goals were set with 
the knowledge that the technology made it possible to 
implement URIts market strategy. The first keys to success 
were: 
1. Knowledge of the market and its needs, 
2. A work force with extensive experience in the 
industry and with the technology, 
3. Clear market goals that were established with the 
knowledge of what was technologically feasible. 
4. Knowledge of the capabilities of existing 
technology, 
The challenge of designing a highly functional system 
using modern technology with cost constraints led to the 
assembly of a well-qualified, experienced technical staff. 
This staff was able to design technology to meet the 
marketing objectives of the firm. ~dditional success 
factors include: 
5. Expertise in the creation and management of 
technology. 
The need for credibility and the objective of providing 
outstanding service led to strategic alliances for service 
and for the network. URI was willing to buy products and 
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services to reduce its development time. A final success 
factor then was: 
6. URI1s willingness to look outside the firm for 
solutions to problems and to form alliances with other 
organizations. 
The competition 
URI faces a great deal of competition in its markets. 
What advantages does it have? URI has the following 
strengths in the marketplace: 
The funding firm provided backing and credibility 
URI formed an alliance for nationwide service 
URI is less expensive than competitors for equivalent 
features 
URI fits the existing environment due to its open 
architecture 
The system is designed from the customer's perspective 
by a firm that understands the business 
The competition has poor service 
URI1s competition has the following strengths: 
Some competitors have systems that address additional 
areas of processing 
Competitors have more existing accounts 
Some competitors will resort to heavy price cutting. 
Challenges For the Future 
URI must continually race to stay ahead of the 
technology. In addition, it must develop the next 
generation of its system. URI constantly has to develop 
solutions for crowded workstation memory when adding new 
features. The company has prototypes running unders Windows 
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3.0 which should allow for the expansion of software 
functions at the cost of more expensive hardware. URI may 
also have to develop a UNIX version of the workstation to 
satisfy some customers. In addition it has been necessary 
to offer custom features to make sales; originally UXI had 
planned to provide the same system to each customer. In 
competitive situations, the firm had to make special 
modifications that are expensive to create and maintain. 
A significant challenge for URI is the fact that 
technological advances decrease the barriers to entry for 
potential competitors. Using Windows 3.0 or UNIX with a 
graphical user interface, a competitor can develop soze of 
the workstation features more easily today than URI could 
two years ago using DOS, but at a higher cost. To sustain 
any kind of competitive or market advantage, URI must 
continue to innovate by applying new technology to enhance 
its products. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Start ups dependent upon technology need to conslder 
the concurrent development of marketing and technology 
strategy. Market needs drive the technology while 
technology enables a market strategy. As shown in Fig..ire 6, 
market and technology strategies are interdependent ard need 
to be developed concurrently. The market suggests a certain 
vision for the functions and architecture of the product. 
The technology enables developers to achieve that product 
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vision. The needs of the marketplace influence the outcome 
of certain technological decisions. During design, the 
capabilities of the design team and technology partially 
determine what can be offered in the marketplace. 
In addition to the model in Figure 6, the URI case 
suggests that it helps to have experience in the market and 
with the technology. URI managed to hire very well- 
qualified staff members. By accepting the offer from its 
funding firm, URI was able to solve the problem of 
capitalization and get on with its development efforts. The 
firm was also v:illing and able to form strategic alliances 
at critical points in its history. 
It seems safe to conclude that market and technological 
considerations must complement each other. For this 
"medium-tech" firm, it is not possible to separate one 
strategy from another. The founders feel for the market was 
probably the doriinant influence as it formed the goals for 
the technology development effort. However, the firm 
established its marketing goals precisely because it knew 
the technology existed to make them achievable! 
Referring to Figure 3, concurrent strategy development 
for marketing and technology made a significant contribution 
to the success of URI. The close integration of technology 
and marketing reduced the time required to develop a product 
and helped assure that it was responsive to the marketplace. 
The luxury of developing technology and marketing strategy 
sequentially may no longer be feasible. Concurrent 
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technology and market strategy development may be necessary 
in the highly competitive environment of firms offering 
technology-based products and services. 
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Fiaure 5: Three-Year Statistics for URI 
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Figure 6 
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Critical Events in the 
Growth of URI 
Table 1 
Strategy 
Critical Event Business Market Technoloqy 
Former employer's system Support General Hierarchy 
general 
customer 
Merger of former 
employer 
Founder decides to 
start own business 
February-March Year 1 
Meet at founder's 
apartment 
"Dream System" 
University meeting 
March Year 1 
Start over again 
-ignore predecesorls 
system 
Funding 
April Year 1 
Chairman appointed 
Put team together 
quickly 
Locating offices 
May 1, Year 1 
Growth 
Develop 
system with 
best cost/ 
performance 
vision of 
business 
cost/ 
performance 
Avoid legal 
concerns 
~inancing 
Get team 
together 
before take 
other jobs 
Experience 
Sales 
Strong, 
competent 
A business 
General Common 
systems 
General Modern, 
open 1 
PC arch- 
itecture 
General Modern, 
open, 
PC arch- 
itecture 
General Work- 
station 
Avoid Newer 
legal technology 
concerns offers 
betcer 
design 
Credi- Finance 
bility develop- 
n1er.c 
Credi- 
bility 
Small, 
strong 
team 
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Architecture Use existing General Push 
of data machine, systems, open processing 
L,AN, workstation architecture to desk, 
open arch- 
tecture 
overlapping windows Advanced Technol- Extending 
and typing in window system at ogy lead- DOS and 
reasonable ership avoiding 
cost costly 
hard/sof t 
ware 
Finding mini that Saved 6 
could be server months 
with multi-tasking 
and UNIX 
Solve technical Develop demo 
problems : 
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